We consider a non-stochastic privacy-preserving problem in which an adversary aims to infer sensitive information S from publicly accessible data X without using statistics. We consider the problem of generating and releasing a quantization X of X to minimize the privacy leakage of S toX while maintaining a certain level of utility (or, inversely, the quantization loss). The variables S and X are treated as bounded and non-probabilistic, but are otherwise general. We consider two existing non-stochastic privacy measures, namely the maximum uncertainty reduction L0(S →X) and the refined information I * (S;X) (also called the maximin information) of S. For each privacy measure, we propose a corresponding agglomerative clustering algorithm that converges to a locally optimal quantization solutionX by iteratively merging elements in the alphabet of X. To instantiate the solution to this problem, we consider two specific utility measures, the worst-case resolution of X by observingX and the maximal distortion of the released dataX. We show that the value of the maximin information I * (S;X) can be determined by dividing the confusability graph into connected subgraphs. Hence, I * (S;X) can be reduced by merging nodes connecting subgraphs. The relation to the probabilistic information-theoretic privacy is also studied by noting that the Gács-Körner common information is the stochastic version of I * and indicates the attainability of statistical indistinguishability.
I. INTRODUCTION
N OWADAYS we share and exchange data with others regularly while being increasingly concerned about whether our personal data is well protected. In particular, in this big data era, advances in efficient data analytics have improved an adversary's ability in obtaining individuals' private information [1] . For example, machine learning models with high accuracy can potentially reveal individual labels of the training data as in the case of membership information attacks [2] . In these cases, the privacy attack can happen during the legitimate use of data, e.g., querying the dataset, survey report, and speech recognition, without direct access to confidential data. Thus, the meaning of privacy has moved far beyond its original definition in [3] and cannot be achieved by just 'anonymizing' or 'secluding' the sensitive data from release.
For a user in the public domain who is interested in the aggregated statistics and interacts with a data curator using queries, the differential privacy (DP) [4] provides a mathematical definition for the privacy loss: an upper bound N. Ding is with the CSIRO's Data61. e-mail: ni.ding@data61.csiro.au F. Farokhi is with the University of Melbourne and the CSIRO's Data61. The work of F. Farokhi was, in part, funded by the office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research) at the University of Melbourne. e-mail: farhad.farokhi@unimelb.edu.au; farhad.farokhi@data61.csiro.au on how the statistics of sanitized/randomized responses to a query change with and without an individual's record. By replacing query response with data mining, e.g., maximum a posteriori estimate, DP can be tuned to a privacy measure in statistical inference problems, e.g., in machine learning [5] , [6] . While DP is concerned with the individual indistinguishability of the released data, privacy in information theory [7] - [9] refers to the exact amount (e.g., the number of bits) of sensitive information that is leaked to the public. This enables study of privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT) via the problem of minimizing the privacy leakage subject to a constraint on the utility/usefulness of the released data.
In statistical data mining, unknown quantities are conventionally treated as random variables, measurable functions that map the probability space to the event space. As a result, privacy is usually measured as a stochastic feature using, e.g., the mutual information in [7] or the Rényi divergence 1 in [4] , [9] . However, in some practical applications, it may be preferred to measure and optimize privacy or information leakage in a non-stochastic setting. For instance, consider the problem of releasing a table of just 50 records 2 . The size is not large enough for making probabilistic inference about the population. The data curator's concern could be whether an adversary can gain private information that is not based on statistics. Kolmogorov had partly answered this question in his early study [11] stating that the more values of sensitive data appears concurrently with the released data, the less certain an adversary is about the sensitive data. This is also an information-theoretic interpretation of the k-anonymity [12] and motivated the adoption of non-stochastic privacy metrics [13] , [14] . Non-stochastic treatment of variables and measures of information have proved popular in other engineering domains, such as networked control and estimation in which variables might be bounded but do not follow a welldefined probability distribution [15] - [18] .
In this paper, we study how to preserve privacy against nonstochastic inference, where the adversary is able to deduce non-statistical features of the data while both privacy and utility are measured by non-probabilistic information quantities. Specifically, for a data curator who wants to share nonsensitive data X with the public, but to protect the sensitive data S that is related to X, the problem can be cast as generating a sanitizationX with a specified level of the data fidelity/utility while leaking the least amount of information about S. Based on non-stochastic information theory, two privacy measures are considered: L 0 (S →X) capturing the information on S conveyed byX [13] and the maximin information I * (S;X) measuring the adversary's knowledge on S refined byX [15] . We reveal different interpretations in privacy between these two measures: L 0 (S →X) measures the maximum uncertainty reduction on S at the adversary side, which is shown to correspond to k-anonymity, while I * (S;X) measures how distinguishable S can be by observingX, or how much private information can be obtained without error by the adversary.
We consider the privacy-preserving problem by generatinĝ X that minimizes the privacy leakage, L 0 (S →X) or I * (S;X) subject to maintaining the utility U (X;X) of the released data above some threshold. The non-stochastic sani-tizationX is done by a quantization method, or a deterministic clustering of the alphabet of the public data X. To this end, we propose a greedy clustering algorithm for extracting a locally optimal solutionX by iteratively merging two elements of X that strictly reduces the Lagrangian function of the privacy-preserving problem. We show that the value of the maximin information I * (S; X) is determined by the maximum number of disconnected subgraphs in an undirected uncapacitated graph, which is equivalent to the confusability graph for the study on Shannon's zero-error capacity [19] . Therefore, the proposed agglomerative clustering algorithm for minimizeing I * (S;X) is analogous to a subgraph merging process. To instantiate the solution to the problem, we study two specific utility measures for U (X;X): the minimum uncertainty reduction I 0 (X →X), the worst-case resolution of the public data X via the released dataX [15] , and the maximum distortion max x,x d(x,x) of the sanitized dataX. Finally, we investigate the relationship between our work and the stochastic information-theoretic privacy studies in [7]- [9] . We elaborate that the Gács-Körner common information [20] is the stochastic version of the maximin information, indicating when statistical indistinguishability, e.g., the DP [4] , is attainable.
Related works: For a continuous sensitive variable S, the problem of designing the quantization f (S) and its sanitizationf (S) to minimize the privacy leakage L 0 (S →f (S)) or I * (S;f (S)) subject to an upper bound on the ℓ 2 -norm f (S) −f (S) 2 was investigated in [13] . This reduces to the privacy preserving problem in this paper when X = f (S). This paper generalizes the framework of [13] as there is no requirement that X is a deterministic function of S. Moreover, the difference between L 0 (S →f (S)) and I * (S;f (S)), the graph decomposition method for determining I * (S; f (S)) and its role in minimizing I * (S;f (S)) are not discussed in [13] . The setup of this paper matches the typical setting in statistical inference 3 and is adopted in most of the stochastic information-theoretic privacy studies [7] - [9] (see Section VI).
Organization: This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews some definitions in non-stochastic information theory. Section III introduces privacy measures L 0 and I * . Section IV 3 Statistical inference considers the situation where a user/adversary is planning to deduce properties S of a population X based on noisy observationŝ X, where the statistics of the population X is usually given or specified.
proposes a graph decomposition method for determining I * . In Section V, we formulate the non-stochastic privacy-preserving problem and propose two agglomerative clustering algorithms. Section VI studies the relationship between our work and the stochastic information-theoretic privacy.
II. NON-STOCHASTIC INFORMATION THEORY
In non-stochastic information theory [15] , for the sample space Ω, we say that the mapping X : Ω → X is an uncertain variable (uv) . For a sample ω ∈ Ω, X(ω) denote a realization of the uv X. The notation X(ω) is simplified to X in the rest of the paper if the context is clear. When X is a finite set, X is a discrete uv. In this paper, we only consider discrete uvs. Here, a uv differs from the a random variable (rv) in probability theory in that we do not assume a σ-algebra subset family over the sample space Ω or a probability measure over this subset family. For a pair of discrete uvs S and X, let S, X {(S(ω), X(ω)) : ω ∈ Ω} and S|x {S(ω) : X(ω) = x, ω ∈ Ω}, respectively, be the joint range of S and X and the conditional range of S based on the observation that X = x, respectively. Note, we can rewrite S, X = x∈ X S|x × {x} and S|X = { S|x : x ∈ X }. We say that S and X are independent, if S|x = S , ∀x ∈ X . For S, X , we have the marginal ranges S and X . The non-probabilistic entropy of a uv X is defined as
which coincides with the Hartley (maximum) entropy [21] or the Rényi entropy H α in the case α = 0 [22] . We assume the base of all logarithms is 2 in this paper.
III. NON-STOCHASTIC INFERENCE AND LEAKAGE
The sensitive/private data is denoted by S. Consider the case where a data curator wants to release X to the public, which is related 4 with S. For example, the taxation office may want to release the income records, which, even if anonymized, could be observed by an adversary in the public domain to infer individuals' identities. The data curator needs to maintain a certain level of usefulness/utility of the released data, e.g., to the ensure correctness of answers to legitimate surveys/queries. At the same time, the curator has privacy concerns in the sense that the more fidelity the released data has, the easier an adversary can infer the private data S. Thus, it is necessary for the curator to be equipped with a valid privacy measure to anticipate the risk of the information leakage.
A. Uncertainty Reduction
For any realization x of the public data X, Kolmogorov defined a 'combinatorial' conditional entropy as log S|x in [11] . This interprets the uncertainty/entropy reduction log(| S |/| S|x |) as a measure of non-stochastic information on S gained by an adversary in the public domain after observing x, or the privacy leakage at the data curator side by releasing x. For the conditional information in the sense of the maximum entropy H 0 (S|X) max x∈ X log | S|x |, the author in [15] proposed the non-stochastic 0-information as the minimal difference between prior and posterior entropy
However, in [13] , it was suggested to consider the worst-case, i.e., the minimal posterior entropy/uncertainty D 0 (S|X) min x∈ X log | S|x |, to quantify the maximal information leakage
as a measure of privacy.
B. Maximin Information/Indistinguishability
Note that neither I 0 or L 0 is symmetric. That is, I 0 (S → X) = I 0 (X → S) or L 0 (S → X) = L 0 (X → S) do not hold in general. However, a symmetric measure of the dependence between S and X can be defined based on the concept of overlap partition. 
Such partition is unique. The maximin information is defined as I * (S; X) = log |P * S|X |. The maximin information I * (S; X) measures the 'refined' knowledge [15, Section III-B], or the highest resolution, on the range S by observing X. We show in the next subsection that I * (S; X) indicates the non-stochastic distinguishability in the view of privacy.
C. L 0 (S → X), I * (S; X), k-anonymity and Non-stochastic Distinguishability
For the release of tabular data, k-anonymity was proposed in [12] to guarantee that an adversary cannot distinguish between at least k rows of the record for each instance of the released data.
The method for attaining k-anonymity is to ensure koccurrences of the records | S|x | = k for each x in the released table. 5 A straightforward result from Definition 2 is the one-to-one correspondence between L 0 the k-anonymity.
While L 0 or the k-anonymity denotes the non-stochastic uncertainty reduction, I * (S; X) measures the non-stochastic distinguishability. In [14] , the non-stochastic privacy is measured as the change of the range of the public data | X|s \ X|s ′ ⊔ X|s ′ \ X|s | conditioned on two distinct sensitive uv values s and s ′ . Here, | X|s \ X|s ′ ⊔ X|s ′ \ X|s | measures the distinguishability between s and s ′ (the lower the value, the less distinguishable and the more privacy). This can be viewed as a non-stochastic version of the differential privacy (DP) [4] . Clearly, if I * (S; X) > 0, there are at least two non-overlapping/disjoint S, S ′ P * S|X such that an adversary can discriminate perfectly any pair of s ∈ S and s ′ ∈ S ′ by observing X. 6 In this case, any distinguishabilitybased privacy measure is minimized (no privacy). It also relates to the zero-error capacity [24] : I * (S; X) is the largest information amount (in bits) of S that can be conveyed without any error by transmitting X [15, Theorem 4.1]. In addition, we can prove the following relationship between I * and L 0 . The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Using Proposition 1, we can interpret the case 0 = I * (S; X) ≤ L 0 (S → X) as even if the adversary cannot obtain some bits of S perfectly from X, he/she might still become more certain on S. Apart from these non-stochastic measures, we show in Section VI how L 0 and I * relate to stochastic information theory.
IV. GRAPH DECOMPOSITION FOR DETERMINING I * (S; X)
Let G X = ( X , E S|X ) be an undirected uncapacitated graph with the node set X and the edge set
Here, G X corresponds to the adjacency matrix in stochastic information theory [24] x2  x3  x4  x5  x6  x7   s1   s2   s3   s4   s5   s6 public data X sensitive data S Fig. 1 . The joint range S, X of uvs S and X with S = {s 1 , . . . , s 6 } and
zero and a x,x ′ = 0 otherwise. Therefore, G X is also called the confusability graph [19] . 7 A decomposition P GX of G X is a partition of X such that any two distinct subgraphs X , X ′ ∈ P GX are disconnected;
The finest decomposition, denoted by P * GX , is a decomposition such that each subgraph X is connected [27] . The following lemma states the equivalence between graph decomposition and the S|X -overlap partition. The proof is in Appendix B.
The solution to the min-cut problem arg min{κ(X ) : ∅ = X X } forms a set lattice [28, Section 2.3] 8 and can be determined by the max-flow algorithm [29] in polynomial time. All the smallest min-cut solutions constitute the finest decomposition [28, Section 2.2]:
Another method for determining P * GX is to run one of algorithms in [27] , [30] , [31] for determining the network strength. 9 The lowest complexity of these algorithms is O(| X |) runs of the max-flow algorithm.
. , x 7 } and the joint range S, X shown in Fig. 1 , we have G X = ( X , E S|X ) in Fig. 2 with the min-cut being 0, i.e., the 7 The adjacency matrix A in [24] and the corresponding confusability graph in [19] only depend on whether the joint probability p(s, x) is nonzero or not. By knowing that each non-zero p(s, x) determines the presence of (s, x) in S, X , the stochastic joint probability p(s, x), ∀s, x can be reduced to the non-stochastic joint range by S, X = {(s, x) : p(s, x) = 0}. This explains that both the Shannon capacity of a graph, the zero-error capacity, and the maximin information I * (S, X) are related to the graph theory or combinatorics [25] , [26] . 8 More precisely, the set T = arg min{κ(X ) : ∅ = X X } ⊔ {∅} ⊔ { X } is a lattice such that, for any X 1 , X 2 ∈ T , X 1 ∩ X 2 ∈ T and X 1 ∪ X 2 ∈ T . 9 If the network strength is nonzero, G X is connected and I(S; X) = 0. However, if the network strength is zero, G X is decomposable and the algorithms in [27] , [30] , [31] return the finest decomposition P * G X [27] .
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x 7 Fig. 2 . The undirected graph G X = ( X , E S|X ) based on the conditional range S|X of Fig. 1 . Both the min-cut and graph connectivity of G X is 0, i.e., G X is disconnected, which means I * (S; X) > 0. The finest decomposition of G X is P * 7 }} and the set of all mincut solutions can be constructed by the fusion of subsets in P * GX :
V. NON-STOCHASTIC PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA RELEASE
Instead of the original X, the data curator publishesX, a distorted or sanitized version of the public data X. The problem is how to sanitize the data to preserve privacy, while keeping the utility ofX above a certain level. In this section, we formulate the non-stochastic privacy-preserving problem as the minimization of either of two privacy measures in Section III, L 0 (S →X) or I * (S;X), subject to a utility constraint. We consider the Lagrangian function of the non-stochastic privacy-preserving problem and propose two agglomerative clustering algorithms to determineX for the minimization of L 0 (S →X) and I * (S;X), respectively. We also consider the problem of finding a privacy-preserving data release schemeX that guarantees the non-stochastic indistinguishability, which is formulated as minimizing L 0 (S →X) subject to I * (S;X) = 0 and the utility constraint, and show that this problem can also be solved by the proposed agglomerative clustering algorithm.
The main objective of the non-stochastic privacy-preserving problem is to determine X and the conditional range X |X through a deterministic function f : X → X with | X | ≥ | X |. Here, f can be considered as a quantization function that clusters/merges all x ∈ X|x tox = f (x). We use a more convenient notation for f , the partition Q = { X|x :x ∈ X }. This privacy-preserving method is captured by the Markov chain S − X −X, where, for a given joint range S, X , a sanitization method X |X results in the conditional range
for X = X|x ∈ Q.
A. Minimizing the Maximin Information
For a given threshold θ, consider the problem min X |X
The Lagrangian function of (2) is L( X |X , λ) = log |P * GX |− λU i (X;X) for λ ∈ [0, +∞). Here, P * GX is the finest decomposition of the undirected uncapacitated graph GX = ( X , E S|X ) for the conditional range S|X . The utility of the released dataX is measured by U i (X;X). We consider two definitions for utility:
The non-stochastic 0-information I 0 (X →X) = H 0 (X) − maxx ∈ X log | X|X | denotes the minimal posterior entropy reduction on X, which corresponds to coarsest resolution of X by observingX. Therefore, I 0 (X →X) indicates the worst-case data utility. So is − max x,x :x∈ X |x d(x,x) for the pairwise distance/distortion 10 function d(·, ·). We show below how to obtain P GX from P GX by a subgraph merging method, the idea of which is then used to propose the agglomerative clustering algorithm for solving problem (2).
1) Determining P * GX : Without constructing the graph GX = ( X , E S|X ), based on (1) and Definition 1, the finest decomposition P * GX can be obtained from the quantization Q and P GX as follows. Initiate P * GX := P * GX ; For each X ∈ Q = { X|x :x ∈ X }, obtain all the subgraphs in P * GX that intersect with X as G X := {G ∈ P * GX : G ∩ X = ∅} and update P * GX by fusing all subgraphs in G X to form one subsetG X = ⊔ G∈GX G, i.e.,
The size |P * GX | is reducing in each iteration and P * GX is updated to the finest decomposition of GX = ( X , E S|X ) at the end such that I * (S;X) = log |P * GX |. For example, for Fig. 2 and the quantization Q = {{x 1 , x 3 }, {x 2 , x 5 }, {x 4 , x 6 }, {x 7 }}, we get the finest decomposition P GX = {{x 1 , . . . , x 6 }, {x 7 }} at the end of the above iterative process (see Fig. 3(c) ). 10 d(·, ·) could be the ℓp-norm or any other pairwise dissimilarity measure.
Algorithm 1: Agglomerative clustering algorithm for solving problem (2) input : the Lagrangian multiplier λ ∈ [0, +∞) and the joint range S, X . output: the quantization Q (t) , the partition P (t) that determines the maximin information I * (S;X (t) ) = log |P (t) | and the graph G that equals GX(t) = ( X (t) , E S|X (t) ). 1 initiate the quantization Q (0) := {{x} : x ∈ X }, the graph G := GX and the finest decomposition P (0) := P * G X ;
Ui(X;X (t)
Merge nodes X * 1 and X * 2 in graph G;
10 t := t + 1; 11 end 12 return Q (t) , P (t) and G;
2) Agglomerative Clustering Algorithm: While problem (2) is a computationally complex optimization problem, in particular for large datasets, the method for obtaining P * GX in Section V-A1 suggests an iterative subgraph merging process for searching the descent direction of the Lagrangian function L( X |X , λ) of problem (2) . Based on this idea, we propose a greedy agglomerative clustering in Algorithm 1 that generates a locally optimal X and X |X by iteratively merging the elements in X .
Algorithm 1 starts with Q (0) = {{x} : x ∈ X }, which means no quantization. In each iteration t, we have the undirected graph G updated to GX (t) = ( X (t) , E S|X (t) ) and the partition P (t) updated to its finest decomposition P * GX (t) . Here,X (t) denotes the released data corresponding to the quantization Q (t) . Therefore, G and P (0) are initiated as G X = ( X , E S|X ) and P * GX , respectively. Algorithm 1 iteratively merge two subsets X * 1 , X * 2 ∈ Q (t) that reduce the Lagrangian function L( X (t) |X , λ) the most (step 4 to step 6). This is done as follows. Consider the Lagrangian function L( X (t) |X , λ) = log |P * GX (t) | − λU i (X;X (t) ). Since merging subsets of Q (t) that belong to the same subgraph in P (t) = P * GX (t) does not reduce |P * GX (t) | but only reduce utility U i (X;X (t) ), we can limit the merging operation to the subsets that belong to disconnected subgraphs in Q (t) . To this end, the set of candidate subsets of Q (t) for the pairwise merging operation at iteration t is defined as
For each X 1 , X 2 ∈ Q (t) , the partition
is obtained by merging X 1 and X 2 andX
{X1,X2} is the resulting uv. We determine the steepest decent direction (X * 1 , X * 2 ) as the maximizer of max U i (X;X
Here, we have max X ∈Q (t)
log |X | so that the steepest decent direction (X * 1 , X * 2 ) can be chosen as
If the minimizer of (5) is not unique, we should choose the pair (X * 1 , X * 2 ) that connects the largest two subgraphs in P * GX (t) . The purpose is to have a smaller minimum of (5) in the subsequent iterations t ′ > t. See the example below.
Example 2. For λ = 0.3, we apply Algorithm 1 to the uvs S and X with the joint range S, X in Example 1 to solve the problem (2) for U 1 (X;X) = I 0 (S →X). We initiate Q (0) = {{x 1 }, . . . , {x 7 }}, G as the undirected graph in Fig. 2 and P (0 
Note that |X 1 | + |X 2 | = 2 for all (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ Ψ(Q (0) , P (0) ). We choose to merge ({x 1 }, {x 3 }) that connect the large two subgraphs {x 1 , x 2 } and {x 3 , x 4 } in the undirected graph in Fig. 2 . This results in a strict reduction of the Lagrangian function △L = log 2 4 5 −λ log 2 2 1 = −0.0219. 11 We get the new quantization Q (1) = {{x 1 , x 3 }, {x 2 }, {x 4 }, . . . , {x 7 }} and the updated graph G in Fig. 3(a) with the finest decomposition 11 One can show that, if {x 5 } {x 6 } is merged at the 1st iteration, we have min (X 1 ,X 2 )∈Ψ(Q (2) ,P (2) ) {|X 1 | + |X 2 |} = 3 at the 3rd iteration. But in this example, the minimum is 2 when t = 3.
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x 137 (d) t = 4 Fig. 3 . In Example 2, the change of the undirected uncapacitated graph G at the end of each iteration t of Algorithm 1, where |P (t) |, the number of disconnected subgraphs in G, is reduced from t = 5 to t = 1 and so is I * (S;X (t) ) from log 2 5 to 0. The subscription of a node in G denotes the original elements in X that are fused to form this super-node, e.g., x 13 is the fusion of x 1 and x 3 .
being
Among the minimizers in arg min |X 1 | + |X 2 | : (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ Ψ(Q (1) , P (1) ) , we choose ({2}, {5}) that connect the largest two subgraphs {1, . . . , 4} and {5} and result in △L < 0. The graph G is updated to Fig. 3(b) . We have Q For the utility function U 2 = − max x,x :x∈ X |x d(x,x), a unique codewordx is assigned to each cluster X ∈ Q such that X = X|x . Two possible choices are the centroid of the clusterx = 1 |X | x∈X x andx = x for some x ∈ X , but other choices are possible based on the application. We denote the maximum distortion for the cluster X ∈ Q bȳ
Here, since max X ∈Q (t)
, max X ∈Q (t)d(X )}, arg min (X1,X2)∈Ψ(Q (t) ,P (t) )d (X 1 ⊔ X 2 ) ⊆ arg min (X1,X2)∈Ψ(Q (t) ,P (t) ) max X ∈Q (t) {X 1 ,X 2 }d (X ) and therefore the steepest decent direction (X * 1 , X * 2 ) can be chosen as
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Consider the utility function U 2 = − max x,x :x∈ X |x d(x,x). We choose the centroidx = 1 |X | x∈X x for X = X|x and d(x,x) = x −x 2 = |x −x|. For λ = 0.3, we apply Algorithm 1 to the uvs S and X with the joint range S, X in Example 1 to solve the problem (2) . We have the graph G updated as in Fig. 4 . At the end of the third iteration, Q (3) = {{x 1 , x 4 }, {x 3 , x 5 , x 6 }, {x 2 }, {x 7 }}, P (3) = {{x 1 , . . . , x 6 }, {x 7 }} are returned. In Fig. 5 , we plot the convergence performance of Algorithm 1 in Examples 2 and 3. It can be seen that Algorithm 1 ensures a strict reduction of the Lagrangian function L( X (t) |X , λ) in each iteration t.
The Lagrangian function L( X |X , λ) = log |P * GX | − λU i (X;X) for problem (2) can be viewed as a weightedsum of two conflicting objectives, the privacy I * (S; X) = log |P * GX | and the utility U i (X;X). For each value of weight or the Lagrangian multiplier λ, Algorithm 1 produces an achievable pair of {I * (S;X), −U i (X;X)} and all pairs form the Pareto frontier, an expression of the PUT (see [32] ). 12 Changing the value of λ may result in different number of iterations before the convergence. For example, if λ = 0.5 instead in Example 2, Algorithm 1 converges at the 1st iteration.
B. Minimizing L 0 (S →X)
Consider the problem min X |X L 0 (S →X), s.t. U i (X;X) ≥ θ.
That is, we aim to minimize the value of k in k-anonymity (Lemma 1) subject to a constraint on the utility. 12 This also holds for problem 7 in Section V-B such that Algorithm 2 produces an achievable pair of {L 0 (S →X), −U i (X;X)} for each λ. Fig. 5 . The convergence performance in terms of L( X(t) |X , λ) = log |P (t) | − λU i (X;X (t) ) versus the iteration index t when Algorithm 1 is applied to solve problem (2) for λ = 0.3. For the utility function U 1 (X;X (t) ) = I 0 (S →X (t) ), the iteration terminates at t = 4 (see Example 2); For the utility function U 2 (X;X (t) ) = − max x,x :x∈ X(t) |x d(x,x), the iteration terminates at t = 3 (see Example 3). As guaranteed by Algorithm 1, both plots are strictly decreasing. Fig. 6 . The convergence performance in terms of L( X(t) |X , λ) = − min X ∈Q (t) log | S|X | − λU i (X;X (t) ) versus the iteration index t when Algorithm 2 is applied to solve problem (7) . For the utility function U 1 (X;X (t) ) = I 0 (S →X (t) ) and λ = 0.3, the iteration terminates at t = 3; For the utility function U 2 (X;X (t) ) = − max x,x :x∈ X(t) |X d(x,x) and λ = 2.5, the iteration terminates at t = 1. See Example 4. Both plots are strictly decreasing.
For the quantization Q corresponding to X |X , D 0 (S|X) = minx ∈ X log | S|x | = min X ∈Q log | S|X |.
The Lagrangian function of (7) is L( X |X , λ) = − min X ∈Q log | S|X | − λU i (X;X).
We propose the agglomerative clustering method in Algorithm 2 for solving (7) : In each iteration t, we strictly increase min X ∈Q (t) log | S|X | by merging all X ∈ arg min{log | S|X | : X ∈ Q (t) } with another subset X * that maximize the utility function U i (X;X (t)
{X ,X ′ } ) over the subsets X ′ in the current quantization Q (t) . The same as Section V-A2, in step 7 of Algorithm 2, for the utility function U 1 (X;X
{X ,X ′ } ), we can choose X * ∈ arg min |X ⊔ X ′ | : X ′ ∈ Q (t) , X ′ = X , S|X ′ = S|X ; for the utility function Algorithm 2: Agglomerative clustering algorithm for solving problem (7) input : the Lagrangian multiplier λ ∈ [0, +∞) and the joint range S, X . output: the quantization Q (t−1) . For the values of X in (6), we reset x 7 = 1 and run Algorithm 2 for the utility function U 2 (X;X (t) ) = − max x, As discussed in Section III-C, we have L 0 (S →X) − I * (S;X) ≥ 0, where I * (S;X) can be considered as the most bits in the leakage L 0 (S →X) that can be estimated/distinguished by an adversary without error. Also, due to the fact that the maximal information leakage L 0 (S →X) could be nonzero when I * (S;X) = 0, it is worth considering the problem of how to find a data release scheme that ensures the non-stochastic indistinguishability min X |X L 0 (S →X), s.t. I * (S; X) = 0, U i (X;X) ≥ θ. (8) In (8) , we assume that θ ≥ min X |X : I * (S;X)=0 U i (X;X). 13 The Lagrangian function is
for λ ′ , λ ≥ 0. The same as Algorithm 1, the steepest decent direction (X * 1 , X * 2 ) can still be searched over the set Ψ(P (t) , Q (t) ), but the iteration should repeat until |P (t) | = 1. The resulting algorithm is the same as Algorithm 1 except that steps 4 to 6 are replaced by
where
{X1,X2} )). If the minimizers of (10) is not unique, we choose (X * 1 , X * 2 ) with the minimum | S|X * 1 | and | S|X * 2 |. Note, the above method ensures a strict reduction of I * (S;X (t) ) for each iteration t, which is equivalent to the case λ ′ ≫ λ.
Example 5. We apply the above method to the uvs S and X in Example 1 for the utility function U 1 (X;X) = I 0 (S →X and λ = 0.3. Starting with Q (0) = {{x 1 }, . . . , {x 7 }} and 
VI. NOTES ON STOCHASTIC INFORMATION-THEORETIC PRIVACY AND DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
The studies on privacy in traditional (i.e., stochastic) information theory [7] , [8] consider random variables (rvs) S and X, and assumes that an adversary infers statistical knowledge on S via X. By considering the correlation, the joint probability p(s, x), ∀s, x, between the private and public data, the problem is to design a private encoder/channel p(x|x), ∀x,x that minimizes privacy leakage, but maintains some level of data utility. This framework is also captured by the Markov chain S − X −X, where p(x|x) is called the privacy funnel [33] . The design of the privacy funnel p(x|x) is shown to be a dual problem to the information bottleneck 14 [34] , [35] . The idea of Algorithms 1 and 2 in this paper is analogous to the agglomerative pairwise merge algorithms in [33] , [35] . Similar to L 0 (S →X), the privacy in information theory is measured in terms of the logarithm of the fraction between the prior and posterior statistical uncertainty on S. For example, the average inference loss defined as H(S) − H(S|X), or the mutual information I(S;X), is extended to the worst case H(S) − maxx H(S|x) [7] and the α-leakage [9] , [36] , where the latter is a tunable measure of the mutual information.
The maximin information I * (S;X) is related to the Gács-Körner common information [20] :
where p(S) = s∈S,x∈ X |s p(s,x) and S,X = {(s,x) : p(s,x) = 0}. Note that I * (S;X) = max p(s,x),∀s,x K(S;X) and therefore K(S;X) denotes the number of bits in S that can be perfectly received by the adversary via the privacy funnel p(x|x). Similar to I * (S;X) ≤ L 0 (S →X), we have K(S;X) ≤ I(S;X) [20] , [37] . This means that, as long as I(S;X) > 0, minimizing I(S;X), or any other stronger privacy leakage, e.g., the maximal leakage [38] , does not necessarily ensure K(S;X) = 0. On the other hand, the case I * (S;X) > 0 indicates that the DP 15 [4] is unattainable. This is because there exists an x such that log(p(x|s)/p(x|s ′ )) → ∞ for some pair of s and s ′ .
Note that, in stochastic information theory, perfect privacy [40] , [41] refers to the independence S ⊥X, i.e., p(s|x) = p(s), ∀x. In this case, I(S;X) = 0 so that K(S;X) = 0, necessarily. Although the condition K(S;X) = 0 alone does not guarantee perfect privacy 16 , the value of the Gács-Körner common information indicates an upper bound on the utility of the released data in the case of the perfect privacy (see [8] ). The case S ⊥X corresponds to non-stochastic independence S|x = S , ∀x, where I 0 (S →X) = L 0 (S →X) = 0 and I * (S;X) = 0. But, since I * (S;X) ≤ L 0 (S →X), I * (S;X) = 0 does not guarantee S|x = S , ∀x, either. See also [15, Fig. 5 ]. Therefore, the solution to problem (8) is not necessarily a data release scheme with perfect non-stochastic privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of how to quantize the public data X intoX to minimize the non-stochastic information leakage of the private data S but guarantee a certain level of the data utility. For the privacy measures L 0 (S →X) and I * (S; X), two agglomerative clustering algorithms were proposed, respectively, both of which generate a solution X |X by recursively merging two elements in X that strictly reduces the Lagrangian function. We showed that L 0 (S →X) measures the maximum (worst-case) posterior range/uncertainty reduction on S at the adversary side and I * (S;X) denotes how distinguishable S is by observingX. We then applied the clustering algorithm for minimizing I * (S; X) to search for aX that guarantees non-stochastic indistinguishability I * (S;X) = 0 but minimizes L 0 (S →) subject to some utility constraint. It is shown that the value of I * (S;X) is equal to the maximum number of disconnected subgraphs in the confusability graph, which can be determined by the min-cut or optimal network attack algorithms. This gives a visualization of the clustering algorithm for minimizing I * (S; X) (Algorithm 1) as a subgraph merging process.
There are some aspects in this paper that can be further explored. First, the proposed greedy clustering algorithms only converge to a local optimum and have the complexity O(| X | 3 ). It is worth discussing how to improve the accuracy and efficiency. Second, based on Section VI, we can combine the results in stochastic and non-stochastic informationtheoretic privacy in real applications, e.g., use non-stochastic measure at the beginning of the data release and switch to stochastic ones when the dataset size grows. Third, it is of interest to further explore the role of the maximin information and the Gács-Körner common information, as well as other common information measures [8] , e.g., the Wyner's common information [42] , in perfect privacy and distinguishability in both stochastic and non-stochastic information-theoretic privacy.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
For the finest S|X -overlap partition P S|X * and the maximin information I * (S; X) = log |P * S|X |, we have the Hartley entropy of S being 
This proves I * (S; X) ≤ log | S | min x∈ X | S|x | = max x∈ X log | S | | S|x | = L 0 (S → X). Note that the inequality K(S; X) ≤ I(S; X) [20] , [37] (see Section VI) describing the relation between the Gács-Körner common information K(S; X) and Shannon mutual information I(S; X) in stochastic information theory can be proved in the same way as (11) based on the Jensen's inequality.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For X ⊆ X , denote S|X = x∈X S|X = x . Since there is no edge connecting any distinct subgraphs X , X ′ ∈ P X , i.e., S|X ∩ S|X ′ = ∅, and X ∈P X S|X = x∈ X S|X = x = S . So, { S|X : X ∈ P GX } for every P GX is a partition of S . For any two points x ∈ X and x ′ ∈ X ′ such that X , X ′ are two distinct subgraphs in P GX , there does not exist a path, denoted by an ordered sequence (x 1 , . . . , x n ), such that x 1 = x and x n = x ′ and (x i , x i+1 ) ∈ E S|X , i.e., S|X = x i ∩ S|X = x i+1 = ∅. This means any s ∈ S|X = x ⊆ S|X and s ′ ∈ S|X = x ′ ⊆ S|X ′ are overlap isolated. Therefore, P GX is a S|X -overlap isolated partition In the finest decomposition P * GX , for each X ∈ P * GX , every pair x, x ′ ∈ X are connected, i.e., there exists a path (x 1 = x, . . . , x n = x ′ ) such that (x i , x i+1 ) ∈ E S|X or S|X = x i ∩ S|X = x i+1 = ∅. Then, we have s s ′ for any two s, s ′ ∈ S|X . So, { S|X : X ∈ P * GX } is S|Xoverlap partition and also the finest one since it can not be further decomposed.
